LUDIVINE M. GAMO, as Executor v. JARED MERRELL et al.

LUDIVINE M. GAMO, as Executor v. JARED MERRELL et al.

2025 WL 2355522, G063493 (Cal. Ct. App., Fourth District, Division 3, Aug. 14, 2025)

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California, G063493 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2017-00942930)

Relevant Facts

• Plaintiff Tirso Gamo, age 81, purchased a Maserati automobile from defendants J Star Auto Group, Inc. and Jared Merrell

• The sellers orally represented to Gamo that they would credit him $6,500 for his trade-in vehicle

• A few days after the sale, Gamo's wife reviewed the sales contract and discovered Gamo had only been credited $2,000 for his trade-in

• Gamo claimed he would not have purchased the Maserati or traded in his old car if he had known he would receive less than $6,500

• J Star served multiple sets of requests for admission on Gamo during discovery

• The requests asked Gamo to admit he initialed each page of the contract, was given time to read it, the sellers reviewed the trade-in value, he had no condition preventing understanding, and the contract was not altered

• Gamo purportedly denied or withdrew his admissions to key requests

• The case went to trial and the jury found in the sellers' favor on all claims, including finding no misrepresentation of facts

• The sellers moved for approximately $490,000 in cost-of-proof fees and CLRA fees

• Gamo opposed the motion arguing fees were barred by the financial elder abuse statute's unilateral fee provision

• The trial court denied the fee motion in its entirety

Legal Issues

• Whether the unilateral fee provision in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a) bars cost-of-proof fees

• Whether cost-of-proof fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 can be awarded to a prevailing defendant when the underlying financial elder abuse claim has a unilateral fee provision favoring plaintiffs

• Whether CLRA fees under Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (e) are barred by section 15657.5, subdivision (a)

• Whether cost-of-proof fees and unilateral fee provisions can operate concurrently without conflicting

• Whether claims arising from the same transaction and inextricably intertwined with a financial elder abuse claim are barred from any fee recovery

Positions of the Parties

• The sellers argue: (1) cost-of-proof fees do not conflict with the unilateral fee provision because they arise from different statutes with distinct purposes; (2) cost-of-proof fees reward efficiency in discovery, not success on the underlying claims; (3) unilateral fee provisions protect plaintiffs from adverse fees if they lose, which is preserved even if cost-of-proof fees are available; (4) CLRA fees are separately authorized and not subject to the same analysis as cost-of-proof fees; (5) the two types of fees can be harmonized and enforced concurrently

• Gamo argues: (1) section 15657.5, subdivision (a) contains a unilateral fee provision that bars all fees to prevailing defendants; (2) all of Gamo's claims arose from the same transaction and were inextricably intertwined with the financial elder abuse claim; (3) awarding fees for overlapping claims would create judicial reciprocity violating the legislative intent; (4) the Wood v. Santa Monica Escrow Co. precedent establishes that overlapping claims are barred from any fee recovery

Decision of the Court and Reasons

The Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. As to cost-of-proof fees, the Court reversed the trial court's decision and held that the unilateral fee provision in section 15657.5, subdivision (a) does not bar cost-of-proof fees. The Court reasoned that cost-of-proof fees and unilateral fee provisions serve entirely different purposes and can be harmonized. Unilateral fee provisions encourage enforcement of important public policy by protecting plaintiffs from adverse fees if they lose, while cost-of-proof fees encourage efficient discovery by penalizing parties who unreasonably refuse to admit facts they cannot prove. Cost-of-proof fees do not reward a party for prevailing on a claim but rather compensate for the cost of proving facts in discovery. The Court distinguished prior cases like Carver I and Carver II, where contractual bilateral fee provisions directly conflicted with unilateral fee statutes, from the instant case where cost-of-proof fees operate in a distinct context. The Court found that allowing cost-of-proof fees would not materially effect a plaintiff's desire to bring a financial elder abuse claim because the plaintiff remains protected from adverse fees if the claim fails. As to CLRA fees, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial because the sellers failed to provide a unique argument on CLRA fees distinct from their cost-of-proof fees argument, thus waiving the issue. The Court noted that cost-of-proof fees and CLRA fees are materially different and serve different goals, requiring separate analysis. The Court remanded for the trial court to address remaining factual issues regarding whether cost-of-proof fees were warranted and the reasonableness of the requested amount.