Nevada Supreme Court Holds Intestacy Statute Requires Per Capita Without Representation Distribution

Wills and Estate Planning Controversies — Case Summaries

Nevada Supreme Court Holds Intestacy Statute Requires Per Capita Without Representation Distribution, Excluding First Cousin Once Removed from $32 Million Estate

Prepared March 15, 2026

Court: Supreme Court of Nevada

Date: March 12, 2026

Citation: In the Matter of Estate of William F. Ulvang, No. 89422, 2026 WL 695035, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. 22 (Nev. Mar. 12, 2026)

Summary of Relevant Facts

William F. Ulvang, a Lyon County, Nevada resident, died intestate in 2023, leaving an estate with an estimated value of $32 million. Ulvang was predeceased by his wife and had no children. The Lyon County Public Administrator identified Ulvang’s living first cousins as potential heirs of the estate. Under the civil law method for computing degrees of kinship, first cousins are fourth-degree collateral relatives and first cousins once removed are fifth-degree relatives. Jamie Lipson, the child of one of Ulvang’s predeceased first cousins, contested the distribution, arguing she should inherit by representation through her deceased parent.

Procedural Background

The Public Administrator requested an order from the district court confirming Ulvang’s living first cousins as the legal heirs. Lipson contested this determination, arguing that NRS 134.070 should be interpreted as providing a per stirpes distribution scheme, which would allow first cousins once removed to share as heirs by right of representation. The district court concluded that NRS 134.070 plainly and unambiguously requires a per capita distribution of the estate, not a per stirpes distribution, cutting off Lipson’s bid for heirship. Lipson appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.

Main Controversies

The central controversy was whether NRS 134.070, which prescribes distribution of a decedent’s estate to “the next of kin in equal degree,” requires distribution per capita—by the head, to the closest living relatives only, excluding more remote relations—or per stirpes—by representation, which would include descendants of predeceased closer relatives. A secondary controversy was whether the court should overturn its century-old precedent in In re McKay’s Estate (1919), which had interpreted the statute’s predecessor to require per capita without representation distribution. Lipson also argued that the Uniform Probate Code and California Probate Code, which favor per stirpes distribution, should guide the court’s interpretation, and that per capita distribution leads to absurd and unreasonable results.

Position of the Parties

Lipson argued that NRS 134.070 should be interpreted to provide a per stirpes distribution scheme, which would allow all of Ulvang’s first cousins once removed to be recognized as heirs by right of representation. She referenced the Uniform Probate Code and California Probate Code as evidence that the modern trend favors per stirpes distribution. She further argued that McKay’s Estate was outdated, that per capita distribution leads to absurd and unreasonable results and an unjust windfall for the respondents, and that traditional principles of statutory construction—including interpreting statutes in harmony with related provisions of NRS Chapter 134 that expressly provide for per stirpes distribution—support her reading. The respondent first cousins and the Public Administrator argued that the statute’s plain language requiring distribution to next of kin “in equal degree” unambiguously mandates per capita without representation distribution, consistent with McKay’s Estate and the civil law of intestacy.

Holding or Decision

The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, holding that NRS 134.070 requires a per capita without representation distribution scheme. The court recognized the continuing validity of In re McKay’s Estate, found that the statute’s plain language was clear and unambiguous under the civil law of intestacy, and rejected all of Lipson’s arguments based on statutory interpretation, public policy, and modern legislative trends.

Reasons for the Decision

The court held that McKay’s Estate correctly interpreted the statutory predecessor to NRS 134.070 as requiring per capita without representation distribution, and that the relevant statutory language has remained substantively the same since 1919. The court found that the term “next of kin in equal degree” directs distribution to the kindred lowest in degree, with each heir taking an equal share—a reading supported by the Restatement (Third) of Property, which explains that intestacy statutes using phrases like “in equal degree” generally require a nonrepresentational distribution. Applying the civil law method for computing degrees of kinship, first cousins are fourth-degree relatives and first cousins once removed are fifth-degree relatives; because the first cousins are closer in degree, they inherit to the exclusion of more remote relatives. The court rejected the argument that the legislature’s use of per stirpes language in adjacent sections of NRS Chapter 134 should inform the reading of NRS 134.070, noting that harmony does not require sameness and that the legislature’s century-long silence on amending the statute after McKay suggests intentional omission. The court also declined to consult the UPC or California Probate Code, finding no reason to look beyond the clear meaning of NRS 134.070, and echoed McKay’s observation that the policy, wisdom, or expediency of a law is within the exclusive theater of legislative action—a forbidden sphere for the judiciary.