Undue Influence Presumption Raised Against Caretaker-Beneficiary Despite Drafting Attorney's Testimony of Proper Execution

Wills and Estate Planning Controversies — Case Analysis

Undue Influence Presumption Raised Against Caretaker-Beneficiary Despite Drafting Attorney's Testimony of Proper Execution

Prepared March 15, 2026

Court

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York

Date

March 12, 2026

Citation

In the Matter of the Estate of Douglas R. Worsell, Deceased, No. CV-24-1819, 2026 WL 692156 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't Mar. 12, 2026)

Summary of Relevant Facts

In 2018, the decedent executed his last will and testament naming his sister, the petitioner Sandra Sweazey, as his sole beneficiary. The decedent was disabled and had long suffered from significant health conditions. Sweazey served as the decedent's then-primary caretaker over the six years preceding his death in 2021, assisting him with medical appointments, healthcare, legal matters, clothing, groceries, and financial support. The decedent's children, the respondents, had been estranged from him. The will's drafting attorney, Paul Tavelli, testified that he had discussed the implications of disinheriting the respondents at length with the decedent, that the decedent understood and was adamant that such were his intentions, and that Tavelli observed nothing of concern in the decedent's demeanor. However, the decedent had previously sustained a traumatic brain injury, suffered from mental illness, and habitually used marijuana. A longtime friend testified that the decedent had a history of delusions and in 2018 appeared at times “confused.” The petitioner admitted during her deposition that she was at times resentful toward the respondents and that after the decedent attempted suicide in 2021, she removed the respondents from his hospital visitation list.

Procedural Background

Following the decedent's death, the petitioner commenced this proceeding to probate the 2018 will. The respondent children objected, alleging the decedent was not of sound mind and that the will was written under the petitioner's undue influence. The respondents moved for partial summary judgment declaring that a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship existed between petitioner and decedent, which would shift the burden to petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the will was free from undue influence. The petitioner cross-moved for summary judgment arguing there was no proof of undue influence. The Surrogate's Court found a confidential/fiduciary relationship existed and granted respondents' motion for partial summary judgment on that issue. The court denied petitioner's cross-motion, finding material issues of fact as to whether petitioner exercised undue influence. The petitioner appealed.

Main Controversies

The main controversies were: (1) whether the existence of a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship between a caretaker and a decedent, standing alone, is sufficient to shift the burden to the beneficiary to prove the will was not the product of undue influence; (2) whether the drafting attorney's testimony that the decedent was lucid, informed, and adamant about disinheriting his children was sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence as a matter of law; and (3) whether testimony admissible under the Dead Man's Statute exception (allowing deposition testimony to be used in opposition to a summary judgment motion even if it might be excludable at trial) could properly support the denial of summary judgment.

Position of the Parties

The petitioner argued that respondents failed to include proper evidentiary citations in their motion papers and that the drafting attorney's testimony of proper execution negated any claim of undue influence. She also argued that the decedent's son's deposition testimony—in which the son stated the decedent told him petitioner was “controlling his life”—should have been excluded under the Dead Man's Statute. The respondents argued that a confidential/fiduciary relationship was established by petitioner's own admissions about her extensive role in the decedent's life, that the urgently-scheduled will execution and the decedent's known mental health issues raised triable issues on undue influence, and that the son's deposition testimony was admissible in opposition to summary judgment.

Holding or Decision

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Surrogate's Court properly granted partial summary judgment finding a confidential/fiduciary relationship existed and properly denied petitioner's cross-motion due to material issues of fact regarding undue influence.

Reasons for the Decision

The court held that the existence of a family relationship does not, per se, create a presumption of undue influence; there must be evidence of other facts or circumstances showing inequality or controlling influence. Here, the petitioner's own submissions demonstrated she had a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship with the decedent based on the extensive care and control she exercised over his daily life, health, and finances. Once that relationship was established, the burden shifted to petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not occasioned by undue influence. While the drafting attorney's testimony supported proper execution, the court found material fact issues remained: the will appointment was made with urgency due to an “emergency of some kind” amid declining health; the attorney was unaware of the decedent's traumatic brain injury, mental illness, and substance abuse history; a friend testified the decedent appeared “confused” at times in 2018; the petitioner admitted resentment toward respondents and removed them from hospital visitation; and the decedent's son testified that the decedent spoke poorly of petitioner and said she was “controlling his life.” On the Dead Man's Statute issue, the court held that while such testimony may be excludable at trial, it may be considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion so long as it is not the sole evidence proffered. Here, the challenged testimony was not the sole evidence.