Caretaker-Beneficiary's Will Faces Triable Issues of Undue Influence

Wills and Estate Planning Controversies — Case Summaries

Caretaker-Beneficiary’s Will Faces Triable Issues of Undue Influence Despite Drafting Attorney’s Testimony of Proper Execution

Prepared March 15, 2026

Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York

Date: March 12, 2026

Citation: In the Matter of the Estate of Douglas R. Worsell, Deceased, No. CV-24-1819, 2026 WL 692156 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t Mar. 12, 2026)

Summary of Relevant Facts

In 2018, the decedent executed his last will and testament naming his sister, the petitioner Sandra Sweazey, as his sole beneficiary. The decedent was disabled and had long suffered from significant health conditions. Sweazey served as the decedent’s primary caretaker over the six years preceding his death in 2021, assisting him with medical appointments, healthcare, legal matters, clothing, groceries, and financial support. The decedent’s children, the respondents, had been estranged from him. The will’s drafting attorney, Paul Tavelli, testified that he had discussed the implications of disinheriting the respondents at length with the decedent, that the decedent understood and was adamant that such were his intentions, and that Tavelli observed nothing of concern in the decedent’s demeanor. However, the will appointment had been scheduled with urgency by petitioner due to an “emergency of some kind” amid the decedent’s declining health. Tavelli was unaware that the decedent had previously sustained a traumatic brain injury, suffered from mental illness, and habitually used marijuana. A longtime friend testified that the decedent had a history of delusions and in 2018 appeared at times “confused.” The petitioner admitted during her deposition that she was at times resentful toward the respondents, and that after the decedent attempted suicide in 2021 and was incapacitated, she removed the respondents from his hospital visitation list. The decedent’s son testified that, prior to being removed from visitation, the decedent spoke poorly of petitioner in the hospital and told him that petitioner was “controlling his life.”

Procedural Background

Following the decedent’s death, the petitioner commenced a proceeding to probate the 2018 will. The respondent children objected, alleging the decedent was not of sound mind and that the will was written under the petitioner’s undue influence. After depositions were taken, the respondents moved for partial summary judgment declaring that a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship existed between petitioner and decedent, which would shift the burden to petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the will was free from undue influence. The petitioner cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no proof of undue influence. The Surrogate’s Court of Tompkins County found a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship existed and granted respondents’ motion for partial summary judgment on that issue. The court denied petitioner’s cross-motion, finding material issues of fact as to whether petitioner exercised undue influence. The petitioner appealed.

Main Controversies

The main controversies were: (1) whether the respondents’ motion papers were procedurally deficient for failing to include proper evidentiary citations as required by 22 NYCRR former 202.8-g; (2) whether the existence of a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship between the caretaker-sister and the decedent was established; (3) whether the drafting attorney’s testimony that the decedent was lucid, informed, and adamant about disinheriting his children was sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence as a matter of law; and (4) whether the decedent’s son’s deposition testimony—in which the son stated the decedent told him petitioner was “controlling his life”—was admissible under the Dead Man’s Statute (CPLR 4519) in opposition to a summary judgment motion.

Position of the Parties

The petitioner argued that respondents failed to include proper evidentiary citations in their motion papers, that the drafting attorney’s testimony of proper execution negated any claim of undue influence as a matter of law, and that the decedent’s son’s deposition testimony should have been excluded under the Dead Man’s Statute because it recounted specific communications with the decedent during his lifetime. The respondents argued that a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship was established by petitioner’s own admissions about her extensive role in the decedent’s daily life, health, and finances, that the urgently-scheduled will execution and the decedent’s known mental health issues raised triable issues on undue influence, and that the son’s deposition testimony was admissible in opposition to summary judgment under established precedent permitting consideration of such testimony so long as it is not the sole evidence proffered.

Holding or Decision

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, holding that the Surrogate’s Court properly granted partial summary judgment finding a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship existed and properly denied petitioner’s cross-motion due to material issues of fact regarding undue influence.

Reasons for the Decision

On the procedural deficiency argument, the court acknowledged that respondents failed to include evidentiary citations in their statement of material facts as required by the since-repealed 22 NYCRR former 202.8-g. However, the record reflected that respondents’ attorney’s memorandum of law and supporting affirmation did include evidentiary citations for each fact alleged, constituting a “functional equivalent” of the required statement, and petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the omission. On the confidential relationship, the court held that petitioner’s own submissions demonstrated the relationship: she cared for the decedent’s significant needs over six years, assisted with medical appointments, healthcare, legal matters, clothing, groceries, and financial support. The existence of a family relationship does not, per se, create a presumption of undue influence; there must be evidence of other facts or circumstances showing inequality or controlling influence—which was present here. Once that relationship was established, the burden shifted to petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not occasioned by undue influence. While the drafting attorney’s testimony supported the presumption of regularity arising from proper execution, the court found material fact issues remained: the will appointment was made with urgency due to an “emergency” amid declining health; the attorney was unaware of the decedent’s traumatic brain injury, mental illness, and substance abuse history; a friend testified the decedent appeared “confused” at times in 2018; petitioner admitted resentment toward respondents and removed them from hospital visitation; and the decedent’s son testified that the decedent said petitioner was “controlling his life.” On the Dead Man’s Statute, the court held that while such testimony about specific communications with a decedent may be excludable at trial, evidence excludable under the Dead Man’s Statute may be considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion so long as it is not the sole evidence proffered. Here, the challenged testimony was not the sole evidence—there was significant, undisputed testimony and evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the will’s execution and petitioner’s involvement in nearly every facet of decedent’s life.