Deeds by Executor Who Obtained Letters Testamentary Through False Pretenses Are Void Ab Initio

Wills and Estate Planning Controversies — Case Summaries

Deeds by Executor Who Obtained Letters Testamentary Through False Pretenses Are Void Ab Initio, and SCPA 720 Good-Faith Protections Do Not Apply

Prepared March 15, 2026

Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York

Date: March 11, 2026

Citation: In the Matter of Ammie Oglesby, Deceased, No. 2024-03087, 2026 WL 681622 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t Mar. 11, 2026)

Summary of Relevant Facts

Ammie Oglesby and Ethel Oglesby each owned a one-half interest as joint tenants in certain real property located in St. Albans, Queens. The decedent Ammie Oglesby passed away in February 2017. A purported will named Robert Boyd as executor and sole residuary beneficiary of the decedent’s estate. In April 2017, Boyd filed a petition for probate. In December 2017, Boyd filed an amended petition that listed only himself and Orian Collins, the decedent’s niece, as the only parties of full age and sound mind interested in the will—omitting other necessary parties. By decree dated February 2, 2018, the Surrogate’s Court granted probate and issued letters testamentary to Boyd. By deed dated June 22, 2018, Boyd, acting as executor, transferred the decedent’s 50% interest in the property to MRAG Development, LLC. On the same date, Collins, claiming to be the “sole surviving heir of the estate of Avery Oglesby,” transferred the remaining 50% interest—which belonged to Ethel Oglesby—to MRAG. To secure a loan, MRAG gave a mortgage on the entire property to Amida Specialty Opportunity Investments, LLC.

Procedural Background

By decision and order dated May 20, 2020, the Surrogate’s Court vacated its February 2018 decree granting probate and revoked letters testamentary issued to Boyd, on the ground that only Boyd and Collins were cited in the initial probate proceeding and jurisdiction was not obtained over all of the necessary parties with an interest in the proceeding. The petitioner, the Public Administrator of Queens County, was appointed temporary administrator of the decedent’s estate. The petitioner then moved for summary judgment vacating the deeds from Boyd and Collins to MRAG, turning over possession of the property to the decedent’s estate, and declaring Amida’s mortgage void. In an order and decree dated October 4, 2023, the Surrogate’s Court granted the petitioner’s motion. MRAG and Amida appealed.

Main Controversies

The main controversies were: (1) whether deeds executed by an executor whose letters testamentary were obtained by false pretenses—specifically, by failing to cite all necessary interested parties in the probate proceeding—are void ab initio or merely voidable; (2) whether the protective provisions of SCPA 720, which generally render enforceable the acts of a removed fiduciary so long as those acts were undertaken in good faith, apply when the executor obtained the letters through false pretenses and used them to transfer estate property for his personal benefit; (3) whether a purchaser can claim bona fide purchaser for value protection under Real Property Law section 266 where the underlying transaction is void rather than merely voidable; and (4) whether the Surrogate’s Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding.

Position of the Parties

MRAG and Amida argued that the Surrogate’s Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the deeds should be treated as merely voidable rather than void, that SCPA 720 protected the conveyances because the good faith of the executor was a question of fact (relying on Matter of Grillo), and that they were bona fide purchasers for value entitled to protection under Real Property Law section 266. They also argued, with respect to the Collins deed, that Ethel’s 50% property interest had devised to Collins through the deaths of other family members. The petitioner argued that Boyd had obtained letters testamentary by false pretenses—by failing to cite all necessary interested parties—that a deed obtained by false pretenses is void ab initio making the mortgage based on that deed likewise void, and that SCPA 720’s protections do not extend to an executor who acted under false pretenses for personal benefit.

Holding or Decision

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Surrogate’s Court had subject matter jurisdiction, that the deeds from Boyd and Collins to MRAG were void ab initio, that the mortgage to Amida was void, and that possession of the property was properly ordered turned over to the decedent’s estate.

Reasons for the Decision

On jurisdiction, the court held that the proceeding was related to the decedent’s affairs and affected estate administration, giving the Surrogate’s Court subject matter jurisdiction under SCPA 201. On the merits, the court applied the established principle that a deed based on forgery or obtained by false pretenses is void ab initio, and a mortgage based on such a deed is likewise invalid. The petitioner demonstrated prima facie entitlement to judgment by submitting evidence establishing that Boyd’s deed to MRAG was obtained by false pretenses. The deed from Collins to MRAG was also void because it was based on false pretenses and was facially defective—Collins could not transfer the 50% interest belonging to her aunt Ethel, who was a joint tenant with the decedent. To the extent MRAG and Amida argued that Ethel’s interest had devised to Collins through the deaths of other family members, the Surrogate’s Court correctly noted that this argument was supported only by a hearsay affirmation of counsel without personal knowledge, an unauthenticated funeral mass card, and a family tree affidavit that identified several other family members entitled to notice. On SCPA 720, the court distinguished Matter of Grillo. In Grillo, this Court had interpreted SCPA 720 as validating the acts undertaken by the estate’s fiduciary in good faith. The court emphasized the words “fiduciary” and “good faith”: SCPA 720’s protective provisions apply only to acts undertaken by the estate’s fiduciary in good faith when performed prior to removal. Here, Boyd had acted under false pretenses in obtaining letters testamentary, which were then used to transfer the property to MRAG for his personal benefit—the transfers do not enjoy the protective provisions of SCPA 720. The court was not persuaded that Gerlitz v. Biddle required a contrary result, because in that case the letters of administration were revoked for reasons unrelated to any fraud or false pretenses in the attainment of letters or in the property transfer itself. On bona fide purchaser status, Real Property Law section 266 does not apply where the underlying transaction is void rather than merely voidable.