Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele v. Kevin I. Kenna, et al.
Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele v. Kevin I. Kenna, et al.
2026 WL 451532
Court of Appeals of North Carolina, Case No. COA25-530
Relevant Facts
Patrick Steele created a revocable trust in 2007 that was amended multiple times before his death in 2022
The trust included a class of beneficiaries described as 'my nieces and nephews' and 'my wife's nieces and nephews' who were eligible for a $5 million distribution
The trust was amended in 2007, 2013, 2015, 2018, and 2021 by various attorneys including Matt Bullard of Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP and John O'Connor, an Iowa attorney
On September 1, 2023, Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking clarification of the trust's distribution of the 'nieces and nephews' portion
Counter-Petitioners (biological nieces, nephews, and sister) filed a counter-petition alleging Grantor intended to leave the 'Nieces and Nephews Portion' only to his biological relatives
During discovery, Counter-Petitioners served a subpoena on Wyrick Robbins for all documents related to Grantor's estate planning
Wyrick Robbins objected based on attorney-client privilege and refused to produce documents without written consent or court order
On September 6, 2024, Counter-Petitioners filed a motion to compel discovery invoking the testamentary exception to attorney-client privilege
The trial court granted the motion to compel on November 22, 2024, ordering Wyrick Robbins to produce documents within 14 days
Legal Issues
Whether the testamentary exception to attorney-client privilege applies to communications regarding a trust as well as a will
Whether the trial court properly applied the testamentary exception to compel production of documents held by Wyrick Robbins
Whether Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele's personal attorney-client privilege with Wyrick Robbins was inextricably linked with Grantor's privilege
Positions of the Parties
Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele (Petitioner/Trustee) argued that the testamentary exception does not apply to trusts, that only the client can waive privilege not third parties, and that the trial court failed to conduct proper in camera review to protect her personal privilege
Counter-Petitioners (Katie Allare, Gregory Allare, John Mickelson, Ashley Steele, Danny Steele, Brigid Steele) argued that the testamentary exception applies to trusts as well as wills and that the documents from Wyrick Robbins were necessary to determine Grantor's intent regarding which nieces and nephews qualified as beneficiaries
Marital nieces and nephews filed an answer and motion for summary judgment asserting that both biological and marital nieces and nephews comprise the beneficiary class
Decision of the Court and Reasons
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order compelling Wyrick Robbins to produce the subpoenaed documents. The court held that although the testamentary exception had never been applied to trusts in North Carolina, the logic supporting the exception's application to wills applies equally to trusts because the exception applies whenever there is a controversy to determine who shall take property by succession. The court reasoned that Grantor impliedly authorized release of confidential information regarding the trust's terms so the trust could be properly administered. The court also noted that the trial court properly limited the compelled discovery to documents related only to Grantor's estate planning and not to other clients' privileged communications, thus protecting Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele's personal attorney-client privilege where applicable.
Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele v. Kevin I. Kenna, et al.
2026 WL 451532
Court of Appeals of North Carolina, No. COA25-530, Wake County, No. 23E004747-910
Relevant Facts
Patrick Steele created a revocable trust in 2007 and amended it multiple times before his death in 2022
The trust included provisions for distribution to 'my nieces and nephews' with a maximum of $5 million distribution to this class
Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele, Patrick's widow and trustee, filed a declaratory judgment petition seeking clarification of whether 'nieces and nephews' included only biological nieces and nephews or also marital nieces and nephews
Patrick's marital nieces and nephews sought summary judgment asserting they were included in the class
Counter-petitioners (Patrick's biological nieces and nephews and sister) claimed the phrase 'nieces and nephews' referred only to Patrick's biological relatives, alleging he expressed this intent to his Iowa attorney
Attorney Matt Bullard of Wyrick Robbins drafted the 2007 trust and subsequent amendments
Counter-petitioners served a subpoena on Wyrick Robbins demanding all documents related to Patrick's estate planning
Wyrick Robbins objected based on attorney-client privilege and refused production absent court order or written consent
Legal Issues
Whether the testamentary exception to attorney-client privilege applies in the context of a trust dispute, rather than a will
Whether Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele's assertion of privilege on behalf of herself and the deceased client can be overridden by the testamentary exception
Whether Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele's personal attorney-client privilege is inextricably linked with the deceased client's privilege and therefore protected
Positions of the Parties
Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele (Petitioner): The testamentary exception to attorney-client privilege should not apply to trusts, only to wills. The client, not third parties, should be able to invoke privilege. Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele had not waived privilege, and her personal communications with the law firm were inextricably linked and should not be compelled.
Counter-Petitioners (Katie Allare, Gregory Allare, John Mickelson, Ashley Steele, Danny Steele, and Brigid Steele): The testamentary exception applies equally to trusts as to wills when there is a controversy to determine who shall take by succession. They invoked this exception to compel production of estate planning documents to prove the deceased's intent that only biological relatives should inherit.
Decision of the Court and Reasons
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order compelling Wyrick Robbins to produce the subpoenaed documents. The court held that the testamentary exception to attorney-client privilege applies equally to trusts and wills. The logic underlying the exception applies when there is a 'controversy to determine who shall take by succession,' which was precisely the situation presented. The court reasoned that a client impliedly authorizes release of confidential information so that the estate might be properly and thoroughly administered. Although this was an issue of first impression under North Carolina law, the court observed that sister states have similarly applied the exception to trusts. The court rejected the argument that the testamentary exception should not apply when the client asserts her own privilege, finding that the underlying purpose of the exception—ensuring proper estate administration—defeated that argument. The court also noted that the trial court's order carefully limited production to documents related to estate planning for the deceased client and did not compel production of privileged information regarding other firm clients, thus protecting Mary Paula Zaytoun Steele's personal privilege.
In re Estate of Martin J. Lundgren, Deceased - Shen Shen Ni v. Mark Lundgren, et al.
2025 IL App (1st) 240913-U, 2025 WL 2658754
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division, No. 1-24-0913, Appeal from Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19 P 7441
Relevant Facts
Martin J. Lundgren, approximately 89 years old, owned two buildings at 1505 and 1509 North Wells Street in Chicago
Martin was married to Shen Shen Ni, approximately 25 years his junior, whom he married in 1990
Martin had three children from a prior marriage: Marty, Eric, and Mark
In February 2017, Martin executed a will leaving $5,000 each to sons Eric and Marty, with the remainder to Shen Shen
Martin owned the 1505 North Wells property through a land trust established in 1999, with Shen Shen as 100% contingent beneficial interest holder as of 2016
In November 2018, while Shen Shen was visiting China, Mark arranged for attorney Sharon Buccino to meet with Martin, and on November 8, 2018, Martin executed new estate planning documents
The new documents included a new will naming Mark as executor with no provisions for Eric or Marty, and trust documents naming Martin and Mark as co-trustees
Mark was Martin's son, had previously been estranged from Martin due to an incident involving the police regarding Christmas ornaments, but they had reconciled around 2012
Mark's office was in the same building as Martin's residence, and Mark handled various matters for Martin including building repairs and tax/financial issues
In April 2019, Shen Shen filed a petition for guardianship of Martin and alleged Mark had exercised undue influence
Martin died on October 9, 2019, at age 89, while guardianship proceedings were pending
Legal Issues
Whether Mark Lundgren exerted undue influence over his father Martin regarding the execution of new estate planning documents in November 2018
Whether Mark properly executed the trust amendment or whether he failed to properly object/revoke the challenged trust
Whether the trial court correctly applied the burden of proof regarding the undue influence presumption
Positions of the Parties
Shen Shen Ni (Petitioner-Appellant): Mark coordinated with his attorney Buccino to coerce Martin into executing new will and trust documents favorable to Mark while Shen Shen was out of the country. Mark had a fiduciary relationship with Martin as Martin's dependent, and given the timing, the change in beneficiaries, and Mark's dominance over Martin, there was undue influence. Mark also wrongfully used a power of attorney to transfer funds from Martin's account and failed to timely object to the trust amendment, thereby approving it.
Mark Lundgren (Respondent-Appellee): The estate planning documents reflected Martin's own wishes and were not the result of undue influence. Mark acted appropriately and created an estate plan aligned with Martin's expressed wishes. Mark did not exert dominance over Martin; rather, Martin was a strong-willed person who called the shots. The testimony established that Martin was clear and coherent when executing the documents, and multiple witnesses confirmed Martin approved of the estate plan.
Decision of the Court and Reasons
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment finding that the testator's son did not exert undue influence over the testator. The trial court granted a motion for partial summary judgment finding Mark was Martin's fiduciary based on Martin's dependence on Mark. The case proceeded to a bench trial where the court denied Shen Shen's request to set aside the trust based on lack of capacity or breach of fiduciary duty. On the undue influence claim, the trial court found the presumption of undue influence had been rebutted. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the evidence established the foregoing elements of undue influence and Mark presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption. The court found Buccino's testimony credible regarding her interactions with Martin and that Martin was coherent and clear. Multiple witnesses testified that Martin had a strong personality and was unwilling to be swayed by others. The court noted that even Shen Shen's own testimony indicated Martin was his own man. The evidence plainly indicated that Mark had refused to revoke the November 2018 documents, as he believed his father's wishes were reflected in the plan. The court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence and affirmed the judgment in its entirety.
MARGOLIS EDELSTEIN, a Pennsylvania Partnership v. GENE KIRSCHNER and GARY JEFFERSON
2026 WL 243160 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026)
Superior Court of Delaware, Case No. N25C-09-018 FJJ
Relevant Facts
Plaintiff Margolis Edelstein is a law firm that represented defendants Gene Kirschner and Gary Jefferson in the Mid Atlantic Sport and Hospitality, LLC v. Kirchner and Jefferson case (MASH suit)
The MASH suit was resolved when defendants agreed to a Stipulated Judgment in favor of the MASH plaintiff for $289,450 plus interest at 5% per month
Plaintiff law firm claims defendants failed to pay their final legal bill in the amount of $4,399.35
Plaintiff filed suit to collect the unpaid legal fees
Defendants filed a counterclaim alleging the law firm committed legal malpractice by recommending they settle the MASH dispute with an excessive judgment amount and an outlandish interest rate of 60% per annum
Legal Issues
Whether defendants' legal malpractice counterclaim should be dismissed under Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
Whether the counterclaim adequately alleges the prima facie elements of a legal malpractice claim
Whether judicial estoppel bars the malpractice counterclaim based on defendants' agreement to the stipulated judgment
Whether Superior Court Rule 11 requires dismissal of the counterclaim
Positions of the Parties
Plaintiff argues: (a) the counterclaim fails to meet the required prima facie elements for legal malpractice; (b) defendants failed to show facts supporting why they would win the 'case within a case'; (c) Rule 11 governed the parties' submissions and allowed the judge to enter the judgment; and (d) judicial estoppel bars the claim because defendants agreed to the stipulated judgment
Defendants argue: The counterclaim adequately alleges facts establishing legal malpractice—that plaintiff committed malpractice by recommending settlement to an excessive judgment with an outlawish 60% annual interest rate, and that judicial estoppel does not apply because agreeing to a judgment does not preclude claiming the recommendation was negligent advice
Decision of the Court and Reasons
The court DENIED plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The court held that under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is only warranted where under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the counterclaim state a claim for relief. The court found that the complaint adequately alleges the substance of the malpractice claim and puts plaintiff on notice of the claims against it. At the motion to dismiss stage, defendants are not required to plead facts demonstrating they would win the 'case within a case,' nor must they identify an expert. These are matters for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. Regarding judicial estoppel, the court determined that nothing in the Stipulated Judgment is inconsistent with defendants' allegations that plaintiff committed legal malpractice, as defendants could have agreed to the judgment based on incorrect advice given by counsel. The court also rejected plaintiff's reliance on Rule 11, finding that defense argument equally misplaced.
Joseph R. Dawson, Jr. v. Heather Pounds, Individually, as Agent Under Power of Attorney, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jane Rollins Dawson
Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-089 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026)
South Carolina Court of Appeals, Appellate Case No. 2024-001801, Appeal from Lexington County Circuit Court
Relevant Facts
Jane Rollins Dawson (the Decedent) executed a Last Will and Testament
Joseph R. Dawson, Jr. (the Appellant) contested the validity of the Will and sought to challenge its execution and validity
Heather Pounds served as the agent under power of attorney for the Decedent and became the Personal Representative of the Decedent's Estate
The Will was executed with the Decedent's signature and was witnessed by two individuals, including a notary public
One witness's signature allegedly did not comply with statutory witness requirements, though the notary public also signed the Will and a self-proving affidavit page
Heather Pounds was added as a joint owner of the Decedent's bank accounts
Appellant contended the Will was improperly executed and that both the Will and the addition of Pounds as joint owner resulted from undue influence
Legal Issues
Whether the Will was properly executed when one contested witness's signature may not have complied with South Carolina statutory requirements for will execution
Whether a notary public who observed the Decedent's execution and signed a self-proving affidavit page that was incorporated into the Will satisfies the requirement for a second witness
Whether the self-proving affidavit page constitutes part of the Will or a wholly separate document
Whether the Will was the product of undue influence by Heather Pounds
Whether Decedent's act of adding Heather Pounds as a joint owner of bank accounts was the result of undue influence
Positions of the Parties
Appellant (Dawson) argues: The Will was improperly executed because one witness's signature did not comply with statutory requirements; the notary signed only a separate affidavit, not the Will itself; and both the Will and the addition of Pounds as joint owner resulted from undue influence by Pounds, who held power of attorney over the Decedent
Respondent (Pounds) argues: The Will was properly executed because the notary, who observed the Decedent's execution, satisfied the statutory requirement for a second witness by signing the self-proving affidavit page, which was incorporated into and formed part of the Will; the Will was executed without undue influence; and the Decedent freely exercised her testamentary capacity and volition
Decision of the Court and Reasons
The South Carolina Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the circuit court's decision. First, the court held that the Will was validly executed because even if the contested witness's signature did not comply with statutory requirements, the notary satisfied the conditions of a second witness by observing the Decedent's execution and thereafter signing it. The court determined that the self-proving affidavit page, which mirrored statutory language and was signed by the Decedent and witnesses, was incorporated as part of the Will because the Decedent and witnesses signed this page, it referred to executing the instrument as the Decedent's will on numerous occasions, the Will contained no page numbers, and the affidavit was incorporated as part of the document. Second, the court held that neither the Will nor the addition of Pounds as joint owner was the product of undue influence. Although a fiduciary relationship between Pounds and the Decedent created a rebuttable presumption of undue influence, Pounds successfully rebutted this presumption. Appellant, possessing the ultimate burden of proof, failed to show that Pounds exerted influence amounting to force or coercion that destroyed the Decedent's free agency. The court found that the Decedent had testamentary capacity and was free and unrestrained in her volition at the time of executing the Will.
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