Sucesión de Eligio Pérez de Jesús v. Rosa G. Báez González

Sucesión de Eligio Pérez de Jesús v. Rosa G. Báez González

KLAN202500071 (May 30, 2025), SJ2022CV08837

Puerto Rico Tribunal de Apelaciones, Panel Especial (appeal from the Court of First Instance, Superior Court of San Juan)

Relevant Facts

  • Eligio Pérez De Jesús died on January 8, 2020

  • Paula Mercedes Marzant Soto, the widow, executed Will No. 52 on July 18, 2014 before notary Ismael Febres Nieves, naming her spouse Eligio as universal heir

  • Paula Marzant Soto executed a Durable Power of Attorney in favor of Rosa G. Báez González on September 29, 2021, and executed Will No. 63 on November 8, 2021 before notary Héctor M. Lugo Montalvo, naming Rosa G. Báez González as universal heir

  • Paula Marzant Soto was diagnosed with dementia on November 17, 2020, and with memory loss and/or Alzheimer's disease in February 2021; Alzheimer's disease was certified again in March 2022 and urinary incontinence recorded in April 2022

  • Paula Marzant Soto died on August 22, 2022 from Alzheimer's disease

  • The Succession of Eligio Pérez De Jesús filed a summary judgment motion claiming the 2021 will and durable power were null and ineffective

  • Rosa G. Báez González presented opposition to the summary judgment motion challenging capacity and voluntariness of the testator

Legal Issues

  • Whether Paula Marzant Soto possessed legal capacity (understanding, will, and freedom) to execute the November 8, 2021 will and durable power of attorney despite her dementia diagnosis

  • Whether the will and power of attorney were executed freely and voluntarily without undue influence from Rosa G. Báez González

  • Whether a motion for summary judgment can be granted in a testamentary capacity case where material facts remain in controversy

Positions of the Parties

  • Succession of Eligio Pérez De Jesús argued that Paula Marzant Soto lacked capacity to execute the 2021 will and power of attorney due to Alzheimer's disease and dementia beginning in November 2020, citing medical evidence of progressive cognitive decline and that she likely could not handle financial affairs or consent to the change in her will

  • Rosa G. Báez González argued that Paula Marzant Soto was fully capable at the time of executing the documents, presented evidence of her clear statements and normal behavior, and that notary and instrumental witnesses testified she was in full use of her faculties and the act was free and voluntary

Decision of the Court and Reasons

The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of the lower court. The court found that the Succession of Eligio Pérez De Jesús met the formal requirements for summary judgment by presenting enumerated essential and pertinent facts with supporting evidence including medical certifications, physician's reports, and expert evaluations. The appellant (Báez González) opposed, but her opposition did not enumerate the contested facts or attach sufficient documentary evidence; she relied only on her own sworn statement and a witness deposition, with no expert or medical evidence to rebut the Alzheimer's diagnosis. The court concluded that no material fact controversy existed that would prevent summary disposition because the medical record clearly showed Alzheimer's disease, dementia, memory loss, and incontinence from November 2020 through April 2022, which impeded the testator from having sufficient discernment to understand the nature, content, and transcendence of executing the 2021 will. Although instrumental witnesses and the notary testified the testator appeared capable, the presumption of mental capacity was rebutted by comprehensive and convincing medical proof. Therefore, the court confirmed the lower court's declaration that the November 8, 2021 will and related durable power were null and void, with no controversy of fact preventing summary judgment.

2025 ND 220, No. 20250206

North Dakota Supreme Court, Appeal from District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District

Relevant Facts

  • William C. Hansen and Verna Hansen executed a Revocable Trust Agreement in December 1997

  • The trust agreement instructed the trustee to hold separate shares for the benefit of each settlor

  • Upon William C. Hansen's death, his separate share was to be held according to a paragraph titled 'Residuary Trust'

  • The trust contained a 'Revocable Trust' provision stating each settlor expressly reserves the right to amend or revoke the instrument as it relates to their respective separate trust

  • The provision stated each settlor expressly waives those rights as to the trust as established or created by the other settlor

  • The provision explicitly states neither settlor shall have any control or power of any kind over the other's separate share or trust fund

  • William C. Hansen signed a durable power of attorney on the same day as the trust, naming Verna Hansen as attorney in fact

  • Verna Hansen, acting as William C. Hansen's attorney in fact, amended the trust agreement in April 1998 and January 1999

  • The amendments changed the instructions for distribution upon Verna's death

  • William C. Hansen died in February 1999, William A. Hansen died in 2017, and Verna A. Hansen died in 2019

  • Bravera Wealth, as trustee, filed a petition in 2024 for an order declaring beneficiary rights

Legal Issues

  • Whether an agent acting under a power of attorney has authority to amend a trust agreement, specifically whether N.D.C.C. § 59-14-02(5) requiring express written authorization applies in a proceeding commenced after July 31, 2007, even though the trust and the 1998–1999 amendments predate the statute

  • Whether the trust agreement itself provided express authorization for agents to amend the trust through the general provisions regarding property management and transfers

  • Whether the amendments are valid despite the prohibitory language in the trust limiting each settlor's power over the other settlor's separate share

Positions of the Parties

  • William Anthony Hansen (Tony) argued the amendments are invalid because N.D.C.C. § 59-14-02(5) requires express authorization for an agent to amend a trust, and the power of attorney and trust agreement contain no such express authorization, only general business powers that are insufficient to meet the express authorization requirement

  • Catherine Hansen Dietemann and Lauren Dietemann argued the amendments are valid because N.D.C.C. § 59-14-02(1) provides alternative authority, the power of attorney grants explicit powers to transfer property to trusts and make gifts that together authorize amendment, and the express authorization requirement does not apply to trusts created before August 1, 2007

Decision of the Court and Reasons

The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case. The court held that the district court erred in not applying N.D.C.C. § 59-14-02(5) express authorization requirement when deciding whether the amendments are valid. The court found that the only language in the trust concerning amendments is prohibitory, with Verna Hansen expressly waiving her right to amend or revoke the trust created by William C. Hansen and having no control or power over his separate share. The court determined that the general provisions in the power of attorney—even though they included explicit powers to transfer property to trusts and make gifts—do not specifically indicate she had authorization to amend the trust. The word 'express' means clearly and unmistakably communicated, stated with directness and clarity, and general provisions are insufficient to satisfy this requirement. Absent express written authorization, the amendments are invalid under N.D.C.C. § 59-14-02(5). The judgment was reversed and remanded for a declaration of beneficiary rights according to the original trust terms.

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